HardenedBSD-stable amd64 installers

11-STABLE
git git clone --single-branch --branch hardened/11-stable/master https://github.com/hardenedbsd/hardenedbsd-stable/ hardenedbsd-11-stable
installers http://installer.hardenedbsd.org/hardened_11_stable_master-LAST/
PORTS
git git clone --single-branch --branch master https://github.com/hardenedbsd/hardenedbsd-ports/ /usr/ports/
tar.gz fetch -o hardenedbsd-ports.tar.gz 'https://github.com/HardenedBSD/hardenedbsd-ports/archive/master.tar.gz'
zip fetch --no-verify-peer -o hardenedbsd-ports.zip 'https://github.com/HardenedBSD/hardenedbsd-ports/archive/master.zip'

Stable release: HardenedBSD-stable 11-STABLE v1100056.3

HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.3 - https://github.com/HardenedBSD/hardenedBSD-stable/releases/tag/HardenedB...

Highlights:

  • HBSD: do not allow to override init_exec by default from loader when the kernel compiled with PAX_HARDENING (19f62c611d729b0e11aeea09cca92b8a2357e086)
  • HBSD MFC r337774: Reserve page at the physical address zero on amd64. (2be594934556ef121ee095b76cbed845cf51fbb3) [CVE-2018-3620]
  • Limit IP reassembly queues (b237529341a40e980dbbb8998bd029dd805f976f 473b73fec73ba098937b1deb304cbb285fed289a 3b9d004b0f08c95203a2a61bdb293a075470d55e 9154624e12ec34b0048dd9ca7159a4b7fdda80e7 dfb2edc8f5fa836a42011e06d48ee99560312081 d85d7540a7fc2cf733c4a655a4c9b28fb6acf42c 54c1ac1408df4b7b0186933e804da8a5a622c24f b3822a674366465673f831e3ff2b544e7292f9242762fee5dd30eb9f1896295c63521e86a9b98d06 95d18bdb4de4bc81529cae34a3e1976145d6fcb1f0d4e7bdc43c2e330df8bf6cb1fca39295403ffd) [FreeBSD-SA-18:10.ip CVE-2018-6923]
  • HBSD MFC r337745: MFV r337744: Sync libarchive with vendor. [CVE-2017-14501]
  • MFC r337785: Provide part of the mitigation for L1TF-VMM. (249be5558ae7f7a429466ea46764dfb581133a03) [CVE-2018-3646]
  • MFC r336855 Fix the long term ULE load balancer so that it actually works. (e2d93727643b74f67085eb874430e0e9eeb57641)

Installer images:
http://installer.hardenedbsd.org/pub/HardenedBSD/releases/amd64/amd64/IS...

CHECKSUM.SHA512:

SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.3-amd64-bootonly.iso) = ebb9bcfff4ae383a5786f1c604d1a8798168b452f3c60c93138987e42248c85c54986d86707e03f18cf5166dae95b18b87ed075bce1829c314007a6988c7248d
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.3-amd64-disc1.iso) = d59e6c829713f8a93bcafd712205598f690d4c4933bc5798f7c727382e84b18450cf2e166b3ff5fabdb410a73873fa238d7a90913de80f25af1ec1cfaa62bffd
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.3-amd64-memstick.img) = 63da6f43b0d280e4af5acd57541bd0b8876910e2ec433e076ece608737c9770672629a009dc6522b366432d69c095860fceab0fac2ed2d1c9f9e9da6f8d6bd4b
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.3-amd64-mini-memstick.img) = 1b720e5735c549b24154d7d12ed945fa3a0fbca55304c344845ae731fcdb0a990f07c299d5e9fb7cf858af4d88392fcfb7b930a070ffd4b2bffadf56a7b260eb

CHECKSUM.SHA512.asc:

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Stable release: HardenedBSD-stable 11-STABLE v1100056.2

HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.2 - https://github.com/HardenedBSD/hardenedBSD-stable/releases/tag/HardenedB...

Highlights:

  • HBSD MFC r333405: Remove PG_U from the rest of the kernel pmap ptes. (6840ef5d2739bb01a0dc7d192316bd18eb24967b)
  • crypto/libressl: Security update to 2.6.5 (ace3164bc710f03d7978019792dedb0a236c52e0)
  • MFC r336761 & r336781: Allow a EVFILT_TIMER kevent to be updated. (a1143bbcefc092238acc75578211f8938cddd8c8)
  • MFC r337384: Address concerns about CPU usage while doing TCP reassembly. (db2e2eea0366604ed65e6f50824471e22035f343) [FreeBSD-SA-18:08.tcp CVE-2018-6922]
  • MFC r336919, r336924: efirt: Add tunable to allow disabling EFI Runtime Services
  • Libarchive update (3ff094362c83c79ca9d501ec9e52a11690e8beff) [CVE-2017-14503]
  • HBSD MFC r313168: Fix VIMAGE-related bugs in TFO. (7a58c5a57aba467d77542a81e797330c3b4ec0bf)
  • HBSD MFC r333885: ctf dwarf: don't report "no dwarf entry" as if it were an error (c4bda35c98a3d1f587b7d6235b8d23161922070e)
  • MFC r336763: Add workarounds for several Ryzen erratas, on amd64. (b26157613a63f16d4822e421cd65ebf5524af67a)
  • MFC: r336357 Modify the reasons for not issuing a delegation in the NFSv4.1 server. (88b6d0a280d23369b39c11398cacc17ff7f39da3)
  • MFC r336683: Extend ranges of the critical sections to ensure that context switch code never sees FPU pcb flags not consistent with the hardware state. (e0245aeafd4d0ab7073f8d616840077f69e15a2a)
  • MFC r336188: Improve bhyve exit(3) error code. (ff4bc3fee787254597b6a515f16495b20ed620c9)
  • HBSD: Really bring hbsd-update current (630cab9f8eeee3907157f181c4c7a4d8183babff)
  • mlx5 updates
  • ofed updates
  • arm64 updates
  • msun updates

Installer images:
http://installer.hardenedbsd.org/pub/HardenedBSD/releases/amd64/amd64/IS...

CHECKSUM.SHA512:

SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.2-amd64-bootonly.iso) = 2f75e591853aa932b8a6576ff5499b530fbddd0974a19463cd88b269e9faed6021282204485240486608033b3e05d9ed65463849263785efe9a97b7cc0065a50
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.2-amd64-disc1.iso) = 25545b3ab97265b53984609886b5bd2941a4140a742d5285816bbb37720584a20e8d9f16fa001eb854aa27c498a6341af0e48848109aceafea0086ab451527bc
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.2-amd64-memstick.img) = 3d6080deccb880b1e228636869598e0763cb40d4ec1a228d82b39f9a169cec1f5c846db3ccc2045e654ec8880c27c2e9be4b873c6201c5bae3060a6b923106fc
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.2-amd64-mini-memstick.img) = cb49fa02e29d9aacf18d84e94bcdfe0d90f874903047dcb4bf06aae40ec54b0b4f68114a38d54599d04a0f972ffd1f60d9ddfbb2a06e5c3a2a4682cf59d934c1

CHECKSUM.SHA512.asc:

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Stable release: HardenedBSD-stable 11-STABLE v1100056.1

HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.1 - https://github.com/HardenedBSD/hardenedBSD-stable/releases/tag/HardenedB...

Highlights:

  • MFC r336273: pf: Fix panic on vnet jail shutdown with synproxy (0873e9ee23e89e484beda97e2df50de20eb5eb49)
  • MFC r336275: pf: Fix synproxy (b21dc776778cd732b26ce6cbc6cc5d11b902815c)
  • HBSD: Bring usr.sbin/hbsd-update current (7131affd05b24405930598458f21d5aed58372b2)
  • MFC r335939, r336088: Add setproctitle_fast(3) for frequent callers. (b0161972b61f32e3939b1d00ed596a51f2d9df53)
  • MFC r336195: unbreak dhclient(8) option 26 processing (6cf691c4162ca1b63686cf0168c7c7308abcf749)
  • MFC r336060: Allow the use of slashes in process names of RFC 3164 formatted messages (1443b72deb5a8d24de24dca3c17f7584a1bcdc85)
  • MFC r334296: Fix "Bad tailq" panic when auditing auditon(A_SETCLASS, ...) (2629e7874930097ab4606daa386c9c151be0855b)
  • MFC: r333508 Add support for the TestStateID operation to the NFSv4.1 server. (63f6f19b0756b18f2e68d82cbe037f21f9a8c500)
  • MFC r335921: Allow jail names (not just IDs) to be specified for: cpuset(1), ipfw(8), sockstat(1), ugidfw(8) (fbeac7fa845df8507cfd3ff4205e4edce5cd64a3)
  • MFC r335595-r335596 r335595: Modernize usage of "restrict" keyword in ntp.conf (026ad5cf663bf4ef529f4e74337e0713b9f9c22b)
  • llvm/clang/lldb update to 6.0.1 (b11d8bd84ca80f747465696403ade22f752ca6d7)
  • libnv updates
  • msun updates
  • fsck_msdosfs updates

Installer images:
http://installer.hardenedbsd.org/pub/HardenedBSD/releases/amd64/amd64/IS...

CHECKSUM.SHA512:

SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.1-amd64-bootonly.iso) = 7c7350a80f50ba19d7e1c64557ac0cb22c90f22a3124dd27a789c4c293d9ae5d3f895d8ab885ae6ca7236fb3d63236df9d6aa8c96cc3cf9475db070c8e5d71ed
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.1-amd64-disc1.iso) = 21ad6239b58e1e61217a81785f66180e1559a1e17cf239f3a2097e70a7b8e5e713bd47a0cb6ba9a00609874bb35806d4b4214cf73c01281e44f46c647caab4b2
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.1-amd64-memstick.img) = 07ef9e0229a81bf97fdd871cf45b3bda787a4a6e0ed60740d404e4915c1fa4b99108a27e299bed27c861830c64a48eafc145528ad9c2047aec857264572a68c9
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056.1-amd64-mini-memstick.img) = ae6ea867c87c2dde581139a652ec648b2f0ba7b87337183c42d556d4a6383f41f4ef3bcaa7dfd7d9841d7bd78dfe50bfe5885dbe4dbc075b1d4af47d12246c7f

CHECKSUM.SHA512.asc:

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Preliminary Call-For-Testing: Cross-DSO CFI

Over the past year, HardenedBSD has been hard at work in integrating the Cross-DSO CFI implementation in llvm. We have reached a point where we can release an early (pre-alpha) public Call For Testing (CFT) of this work.

For reasons which will be described below, we recommend this CFT be used by those using root-on-ZFS with boot environments. We recommend testing in a dedicated boot environment.

This initial round of testing is best suited for development server installations. Production servers and desktops/laptops are not advised for testing at this time. We're looking for feedback on what works and doesn't work.

Introduction

Control Flow Integrity, or CFI, is an exploit mitigation that aims to make it harder for an attacker to hijack the control flow of an executable image. llvm's CFI implementation provides forward-edge protection, meaning it protects call sites and non-return code branches. llvm includes basic and incomplete backward-edge protection via SafeStack.

CFI in llvm consists of two flavors:

1. Non-Cross-DSO CFI
2. Cross-DSO CFI

For over a year now, HardenedBSD has adopted non-Cross-DSO CFI in 12-CURRENT/amd64. Support for non-Cross-DSO CFI was added for 12-CURRENT/arm64 on 01 July 2018. Non-Cross-DSO CFI applies CFI to the applications themselves, but not on the shared objects they depend on. Cross-DSO CFI applies CFI to both applications and shared objects, enforcing CFI across shared object boundaries.

When an application or shared object is compiled, its source files typically get compiled first to intermediate object files. Enabling Cross-DSO CFI requires compiling and linking both static and shared libraries with Link Time Optimization (LTO). When LTO is enabled, these object files are no longer ELF object files, but rather LLVM IR bitcode object files.

Linking applications that have been compiled with LTO generally only requires ld.lld as the linker. Linking libraries that have been compiled with LTO requires switching certain compiler toolchain components to ones that understand LLVM IR bitcode. To prepare for Cross-DSO CFI, we switched ar, ranlib, nm, and objdump to their respective llvm compiler toolchain components. This gives us the ability to use LTO across-the-board for the HardenedBSD userland, with a few exceptions.

Note that because Cross-DSO CFI requires storing metadata regarding the shared library boundaries at runtime, Cross-DSO CFI requires ASLR and PaX NOEXEC at a minimum to be effective. If an attacker knows the address of the metadata pages, the attacker can first perform data-only attacks for later code execution/code reuse attacks. Similarily, if an attacker is able to mark non-executable, yet writable, pages as executable while still obeying CFI, (example: JIT compiled code) the attacker can still gain perform execution/code reuse attacks.

Known Issues And Limitations

There are a few known issues. Before we dive into the testing procedure, I would like to talk a bit about known regressions. Note that this list of known issues essentially also constitutes a "work-in-progress" and every known issue will be fixed prior to the
official launch of Cross-DSO CFI.

It seems llvm does not like statically compiling applications with LTO that have a mixture of C and C++ code. /sbin/devd is one of these applications. As such, when Cross-DSO CFI is enabled, devd is compiled as a Position-Independent Executable (PIE). Doing this breaks UFS systems where /usr is on a separate partition. We are currently looking into solving this issue to allow devd to be statically compiled again.

NO_SHARED is now unset in the tools build stage (aka, bootstrap-tools, cross-tools). This is related to the static compilation issue above. Unsetting NO_SHARED for to tools build stage is only a band-aid until we can resolve static compliation with LTO.

One goal of our Cross-DSO CFI integration work is to be able to support the cfi-icall scheme when dlopen(3) and dlsym(3)/dlfunc(3) is used. This means the runtime linker (RTLD), must be enhanced to know and care about the CFI runtime. This enhancement is not currently implemented, but is planned.

When Cross-DSO CFI is enabled, SafeStack is disabled. This is because compiling with Cross-DSO CFI brings in a second copy of the sanitizer runtime, violating the One Definition Rule (ODR). Resolving this issue should be straightforward: Unify the sanitizer runtime into a single common library that both Cross-DSO CFI and SafeStack can link against.

As of 07 Jun 2018, libpmc and friends are receiving a lot of code churn in upstream FreeBSD. The jevents application in lib/libpmc/pmu-events is used as a build tool to generate code. Enabling Cross-DSO CFI disables building PMC-related tools (libpmc and friends) due to the jevents application segfaulting during the build process.

When the installed world has Cross-DSO CFI enabled, performing a buildworld with Cross-DSO CFI disabled fails. This is somewhat related to the static compilation issue described above.

Linking with Cross-DSO CFI can cause lld to use an extremely large amount of memory. For each parallel build job, budget around 15GB of memory for the linker.

Due to the issues discussed above, this CFT is applicable to users who either use ZFS or where /usr is contained within the root filesystem.

Procedure For Testing

Use git to clone locally the HardenedBSD Playground repo. The instructions below assume using /usr/src as the location for the source tree. It also blows away your existing source tree, if it exists. If you want to keep your existing source tree, feel free to
modify the steps below to your liking.

Due to the complexity of building Cross-DSO CFI, the buildworld step must be completed twice: once without Cross-DSO CFI and a second time with. The non-Cross-DSO CFI world must be installed prior to performing the second build. As noted above, we will work to ensure this doesn't need to happen later.

These instructions make the following assumptions:

1. The root filesystem is on ZFS, with the proper layout for ZFS Boot Environments.
2. The beadm package is installed.
3. The existing installation is running 12-CURRENT on amd64.


# cd /usr
# rm -rf src
# git clone https://github.com/HardenedBSD/hardenedBSD-playground.git \
src
# cd src
# git checkout -b hardened/current/cross-dso-cfi \
origin/hardened/current/cross-dso-cfi
# make -sj$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu) buildworld buildkernel
# beadm create cfi-01
# beadm mount cfi-01 /tmp/newbe
# make -s installworld installkernel DESTDIR=/tmp/newbe
# mergemaster -iFUD /tmp/newbe
# beadm umount cfi-01
# beadm activate cfi-01
# shutdown -r now

Binary Updates

We will provide binary updates in base for the hardened/current/cross-dso-cfi feature branch on amd64 until this work gets merged into hardened/current/master. Take a look at Appendix A for a sample hbsd-update.conf configuration file for the Cross-DSO CFI work.

Future Work

We're not done, yet! There's still plenty of work to do. Of upmost importance is fixing static compilation with LTO enabled. Without it, statically-linked applications will crash. devd can go back to being a statically-linked application and users with /usr on a separate non-ZFS filesystem will be able to take advantage of Cross-DSO CFI.

Secondly, we need to re-integrate SafeStack, giving us backward-edge protections once again.

Third up is integration with the RTLD. Without it, we still need to disable the cfi-icall scheme for applications that make use of dlopen(3)+dlsym(3)/dlfunc(3).

Given that we're in uncharted territory, we will likely find other issues. We will keep the community updated and informed. Once all issues have been resolved, we will work on integration with ports.

We need to ensure buildworld works with the various CFI (MK_CFI and MK_CROSS_DSO_CFI) options toggled, regardless of installed world state.

Given the tremendous memory requirements, HardenedBSD may not be able to apply Cross-DSO CFI across the entire package repository. The current amd64 package building system is a dual Xeon system with eight cores per CPU (sixteen cores total), 192GB RAM, and 64GB swap. Without Cross-DSO CFI, building the package repo for amd64 takes around 82 hours to complete using all sixteen cores. With Cross-DSO CFI enabled, the package build server eventually runs out of swap using only eight of the sixteen cores.

Though we plan to support Cross-DSO CFI in arm64, amd64 will be the primary development platform until the major issues are worked out. The sanitizer framework needs to be updated to take FreeBSD/HardenedBSD into account on arm64. As of 14 July 2018, the llvm sanitizer framework does not support FreeBSD/arm64. With time, we plan to change that.

HardenedBSD may very well be the first UNIX-like operating system with full Cross-DSO CFI integration across its entire base operating system userland.

Appendix A - hbsd-update.conf

# hbsd-update.conf
# Configuration settings for hbsd-update.
# This file is read in through a /bin/sh shell and uses that syntax.

# dnsrec:
# DNS TXT record to use when looking up the version info for the
# latest update.
#
# This record name seems redundant, but it provides the following
# information:
#     1) architecture
#     2) branch (hardened/current/master) in reverse form
#     3) repo (hardenedbsd)
dnsrec="$(uname -m).cross-dso-cfi.current.hardened.hardenedbsd-playground.updates.hardenedbsd.org"

# kernel:
# Which kernel to install.
# By default, this is intelligently detected by parsing `uname -v`
# output.
#kernel="HARDENEDBSD"

# capath:
# Location of the trusted root certificate store.
capath="/usr/share/keys/hbsd-update/trusted"

# branch:
# Which branch/tag we are pointing to. This option is only used in
# this file for the baseurl option below.
branch="hardened/current/cross-dso-cfi"

# baseurl:
# Where to get the update from.
baseurl="http://updates.hardenedbsd.org/pub/HardenedBSD-playground/updates/${branch}/$(uname -m)"

# dnssec:
# Use DNSSEC for validating the DNS TXT record. Default: yes
#dnssec="no"

Mid-July HardenedBSD Foundation Status

On 09 July 2018, the HardenedBSD Foundation Board of Directors held the kick-off meeting to start organizing the Foundation. The following people attended the kick-off meeting:

1. Shawn Webb (in person)
2. George Saylor (in person)
3. Ben Welch (in person)
4. Virginia Suydan (in person)
5. Ben La Monica (phone)
6. Dean Freeman (phone)
7. Christian Severt (phone)

We discussed the very first steps that need to be taken to organize the HardenedBSD Foundation as a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit organization in the US. We determined we could file a 1023EZ instead of the full-blown 1023. This will help speed the process up drastically.

The steps are laid out as follows:

  1. Register a Post Office Box (PO Box) (completed on 10 Jul 2018).
  2. Register The HardenedBSD Foundation as a tax-exempt nonstock corporation in the state of Maryland (started on 10 Jul 2018, submitted on 18 Jul 2018, granted 20 Jul 2018).
  3. Obtain a federal tax ID (obtained 20 Jul 2018).
  4. Close the current bank account and create a new one using the federal tax ID (completed on 20 Jul 2018).
  5. File the 1023EZ paperwork with the federal government (started on 20 Jul 2018).
  6. Hire an attorney to help draft the organization bylaws.

Each of the steps must be done serially and in order.

We added Christian Severt, who is on Emerald Onion's Board of Directors, to the HardenedBSD Foundation Board of Directors as an advisor. He was foundational in getting Emerald Onion their 501(c)(3) tax-exempt, not-for-profit status and has really good insight. Additionally, he's going to help HardenedBSD coordinate hosting services, figuring out the best deals for us.

We promoted George Saylor to Vice President and changed Shawn Webb's title to President and Director. This is to help resolve potential concerns both the state and federal agencies might have with an organization having only a single President role.

We hope to be granted our 501(c)(3) status before the end of the year, though that may be subject to change. We are excited for the formation of the HardenedBSD Foundation, which will open up new opportunities not otherwise available to HardenedBSD.

Stable release: HardenedBSD-stable 11-STABLE v1100056

HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056 - https://github.com/HardenedBSD/hardenedBSD-stable/releases/tag/HardenedB...

Highlights:

  • MFC r335558: Add support for selectively enabling LLVM targets (62b732f45dfe86a663fb78aec3e30ba28d0485c8)
  • HBSD: Switch back to OpenSSL as the default crypto lib (1087d59e45072059e2d20ac2dea1801d995c9a2d)
  • MFC r335569: pf: Support "return" statements in passing rules when they fail. (9e4899f2d2193db78e985cc427fcfb870a20e40a)
  • MFC r335641: Fix a stack overflow in mount_smbfs when hostname is too long. (0b39c762ec1d16fa2bca8a386d2e1af10e106a5e) [FreeBSD-SA-Candidate]
  • MFC r333059 (by tychon): Expand the checks for UCR3 == PMAP_NO_CR3 to enable processes to be excluded from PTI. (bad2d0f8e14dbc917f3ccbeb0adee1e045a63ae5)
  • loader updates
  • bhyve updates
  • libpcap updates

Installer images:
http://installer.hardenedbsd.org/pub/HardenedBSD/releases/amd64/amd64/IS...

CHECKSUM.SHA512:

SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056-amd64-bootonly.iso) = 1df1060cea47345ddaa4be6a93de16f5443a5e4b299e58aa89aaa5c9af16251d80cdd76f4b7a083686b78e3cafbf361c69b844fb6b75ca7919f969cbffe769ad
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056-amd64-disc1.iso) = 78281285ea05b4adeb1933c50e780054419edd6aabccd350df6304a06b9fca02ea39863a2a1edaa9d615ff8c2cf78e63e2fc0f254adab4da8f3f7ed618ee52c2
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056-amd64-memstick.img) = 0000bcab6e06421c7fdf0054cd13ecc339f8dc894082fe3a6f0d7b5039b7313fa14f14ee1db1d84ad5b7ad6679c1bd53438d52ebb819a67786d8e29c09d956e1
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100056-amd64-mini-memstick.img) = 08066dc2de7e19a7535188fe30d79bf7bd78c6fc877001a75d562b5e1ace2fb31a7e429cf6022d13e15e4d0a4cefa6b9ba8787725ad545e8aa32020193503338

CHECKSUM.SHA512.asc:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=HMQk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Stable release: HardenedBSD-stable 11-STABLE v1100055.5

HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100055.5 - https://github.com/HardenedBSD/hardenedBSD-stable/releases/tag/HardenedB...

Highlights:

  • MFC r333321,r333707: x86 cpususpend_handler: call wbinvd after setting suspend state bits (84c8399a4cb4fb3e5f4c52c6791696098c94fe02)
  • Set stable/11 from -PRERELEASE back to -STABLE. (745cc87c07b5ba623d4628dcddfccd2e605a2c99)
  • MFC r335171: Handle the race between fork/vm_object_split() and faults. (0556a47cc533046623b230de57af8e395f703425)
  • MFC r332994 (by tychon): Handle potential alignment adjustment of the exception frame by hardware. (6c5aa909303a2fc05289f82bf35b95e1fa770c78)
  • MFC r334876: pf: Fix deadlock with route-to (a0ce5787a02b7b00f6c2b509f5641b3fa078652e)
  • MFC r335131 Remove printf() in #NM handler. (2df766da5ab1577d0f8f348da0ce0dd7d1ad4f12) [CVE-2018-3665]
  • LinuxKPI updates
  • sysrc updates
  • nvme updates

Installer images:
http://installer.hardenedbsd.org/pub/HardenedBSD/releases/amd64/amd64/IS...

CHECKSUM.SHA512:

SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100055.5-amd64-bootonly.iso) = a4c4d44d2e6f8c9c17682035a0889b3185f8655cc37c23cdbe9b3fc74660585cd528c87ff71abf45d1f622b4eeceeeb99b5b8bbb95a72dd56062d21edf0ecebc
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100055.5-amd64-disc1.iso) = e802080c1931d009cffe11e5ed7a162a7ad1dc1e8f644d7fe395b8a90d95f18d157b7d3cc5e5e0a0d3a54460202974233bce4c1d93376330822a81b5446b212e
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100055.5-amd64-memstick.img) = b87544414fc178df8dff82a110fda18dfe810be0d0c395ffd19b669c0210a7c6f952d0da2b843c915dc43d6fb3e8859c79d658fd1b12ad45c288d87f4064a202
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100055.5-amd64-mini-memstick.img) = 772dc30b5c8156012f0309fc092b6557a27eca3ff1356f7aa9c9f3b1b6a141d72579a409bb17e5d93f69ad85cd2b73ff186f8b16392534bce5901f3a23f6346d

CHECKSUM.SHA512.asc:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=3a89
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Stable release: HardenedBSD-stable 11-STABLE v1100055.4

HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100055.4 - https://github.com/HardenedBSD/hardenedBSD-stable/releases/tag/HardenedB...

Highlights:

  • MFC r335072: Enable eager FPU context switch by default on amd64. (dee6710f89d54744c1d97a4088c547b6541dbb0e) [FreeBSD-SA-Candidate CVE-2018-3665)
  • MFC r334038: Enable IBRS when entering an interrupt handler from usermode. (2de20d5b1b0faaf2c7dcb503515af88bfb5aae90) [FreeBSD-SA-Candidate]
  • MFC r334004: Add Intel Spec Store Bypass Disable control. (425d57954121d3b228a3f7aa395e9bc8d2929214) [FreeBSD-SA-Candidate CVE-2018-3639]
  • MFC syslog from master (667052415ebdbade0cd55a3c66b7902227a78760)
  • MFC r334091: md5: perform compare case-insenstive (bc94720a7e512e88c6235155019d5f7c5972ab41)
  • MFC: r333580 Fix a slow leak of session structures in the NFSv4.1 server. (4a4ab2a82843ba496b969eb11f32aeb2f09c2c63)
  • MFC r333783: MFV r333779: xz 5.2.4. (e303059a606066e6076cca385aedac5958b17f34)
  • MFC r334068 (phil): Import libxo-0.9.0 (3549c1ab7a2950f9e8cd373af83fa0a4c6fb8903)
  • MFC Lock primitive updates (8b9af5c67de5a51974b9d4bc7570e0b9700c4fcb)
  • MFC r334050, r334051: Flush caches before initiating a microcode update on Intel CPUs. (cb1c0651a46b4d36bf9eed4a3cdd986aad9c9936)
  • MFC r333892: Fix PCID+PTI pmap operations on Xen/HVM. (a933e7a326f122cb0beb9fdc960f6ab327bf1908)
  • MFC r333228 Implement support for ifuncs in the kernel linker on x86. (0166dfd0a87d24c0280d715e42d03d82610265ad)
  • MFC r333404, r333405: Remove PG_U from the recursive pte for kernel pmap' PML4 page and from the rest of the kernel pmap ptes. (e27432718ce82962556986419ed12b9928d56690)
  • MFC r332504: Set PG_G global mapping bit on the trampoline ptes. (8bba637677bb95dc889605a2dc7b9e5204d2a4a5)
  • MFC r332450: Optimize context switch for PTI on PCID pmap. (3d88b710fd631da86a68457176c459133083e14f)
  • pf updates
  • nat64 updates
  • linuxkpi updates
  • sctp updates
  • nfs updates
  • dwatch updates

Installer images:
http://installer.hardenedbsd.org/pub/HardenedBSD/releases/amd64/amd64/IS...

CHECKSUM.SHA512:

SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100055.4-amd64-bootonly.iso) = 55280d25a0da2254c92d9f1a1b9e8c2e6e88acfa17abcb55b363e64bc078f609f549c2670069e532197cd6808ecd81adfb3452ddc116bc6cc5247e7017078af3
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100055.4-amd64-disc1.iso) = c96086f53c42e3e72d401a9334ff5e258c73ad50190d51a6316c9a00ebb9f141458c0d3a569543ece99e446e5e98a3287faf37f1242d9185141a86fcae704646
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100055.4-amd64-memstick.img) = 5feb136a3477e9c8932f08742b7d9efaaa482835843311f285c233d6cfb9fdde07a75665333d78cdd2167a618edc31f9ba6fd2fc8147ea5f776adfdd49ba9f9d
SHA512 (HardenedBSD-11-STABLE-v1100055.4-amd64-mini-memstick.img) = 117364b3fbea0c4ad5db900f8f96bd85f47616132950735930117c3bce1e3cee9b284cd7773fcc18a94a42656f2ec87ff18ac3e933cf69aad0025d8f9a3ea972

CHECKSUM.SHA512.asc:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=blBu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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